Abstract. In this paper, we describe generic attacks on unbalanced Feistel schemes with contracting functions. These schemes are used to construct pseudo-random permutations from kn bits to kn bits by using d pseudo-random functions from (k − 1)n bits to n bits. We describe known plaintext attacks (KPA) and non-adaptive chosen plaintext attacks (CPA-1) against these schemes with less than 2 kn plaintext/ciphertext pairs and complexity strictly less than O(2 kn ) for a number of rounds d ≤ 2k − 1. Consequently at least 2k rounds are necessary to avoid generic attacks. For k = 3, we found attacks up to 6 rounds, so 7 rounds are required. When d ≥ 2k, we also describe some attacks on schemes with generators, (i.e. schemes where the d pseudo-random functions are generated) and where more than one permutation is required.
Introduction
Feistel schemes are widely used in symmetric cryptography in order to construct pseudo-random permutations. In trying to design such scheme, one of the natural questions is: what is the the minimum number of rounds required to avoid all the "generic attacks". By generic attacks we mean all the attacks effective with high probability when the round functions are randomly chosen. We are mainly interested in generic attacks with a complexity that is much smaller than a search on all possible inputs of the permutation.
Many results are known on classical (balanced) Feistel schemes. In [7] , Luby and Rackoff have shown their famous result: for more than 3 rounds all the generic chosen plaintext attacks on Feistel schemes require at least O(2 n 2 ) inputs. Moreover for more than 4 rounds all the generic attacks on adaptive chosen plaintext/ciphertext require at least O(2 n 2 ) inputs. These bounds are tight [1, 10] . It has also been proved that to avoid all attacks with less than 2 2n computations at least 6 rounds of balanced Feistel schemes are needed [2, 11, 12] . This result is still valid if the round functions are permutations [5, 6] . For more than 6 rounds, some attacks are still possible but with more than 2 2n computations [11] . All these results on classical Feistel schemes are summarized in Table 1 : Table 1 . Results (from [12] ) on G d 2 . For more than 6 rounds more that one permutation is needed or more than 2 2n computations are needed in the best known attacks to distinguish G The aim of this paper is to look for similar results for the case of unbalanced Feistel schemes with contracting functions: we call such schemes "contracting Feistel Schemes". A precise definition of these schemes is given in Sect. 2. The case of unbalanced Feistel schemes with expanding functions instead of contracting functions is studied in [4, 14, 15] . Some results on contracting Feistel schemes or on small transformations of these schemes can be found in [8, 9] . In [9] , Naor and Reingold studied the security of contracting Feistel schemes with pairwise independent permutations. They show lower bounds for the security of such schemes. Lucks [8] gives some security results on contracting Feistel schemes built with hash functions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 and 3, we introduce notations and present precise definitions of the considered schemes and an overview of our attacks. In Sect. 4, we study attacks for k = 3 and d ≤ 6. Then in Sect. 5, we give attacks for any k and d ≤ 2k − 1. Finally, Sect. 6 is devoted to what can be done with more than 2 kn computations. In particular, we describe attacks against permutation generators. All the results are summarized in the conclusion: these tables extend the above Table 1 We introduce the following random variables:
Since we have chosen all the I 3 i equal to zero, we can say equivalently that δ i,j is equal to one when f 2 ([0,
is defined as i<j δ i,j and it is easy to compute E(δ i,j ) = 2 2 n − 1 2 2n . We now compute the variance
. We recall the Covariance Formula:
We need to compute Cov(i, j, k, l) = E(δ i,j δ k,l ) − E(δ i,j ) E(δ k,l ) Let us first consider the case, where i, j, k, l are pairwise distinct We need to consider the influence of the equality f 2 ([0,
In that case we have also X The second case is if both equations are sharing an index, for example i = k We need to consider the influence of the equality f 2 ([0,
This event happens with probability 1 − 1 2 n 1 2 n and both equalities have a probability 
Consequently we have
Since m is smaller than 2 n , we get: For 5 rounds, the internal variables are X 1 and
We have the following conditions:
The attack proceeds as follows: we choose m messages such that ∀i, I 
With a random permutation, these two conditions appear by chance and we have:
Here O( 
We can distinguish the two permutations when the difference between the mean values is larger than the standard deviation i.e. when n . As before this attack leads to a KPA attack with 2 2n messages. But there is a better attack as we can see now. 
where m √ 2 n is the standard deviation, while for G 5 3 we obtain
We can distinguish the two permutations when the difference between the mean values is larger than the standard deviation i.e. when For 6 rounds, the internal variables are X 1 , X 2 and
. We have the following conditions:
With a random permutation, we have:
where O( 
Experimental Results on G 6 3
We have implemented our CPA-1 and KPA attacks against G in KPA and m √ 2·2 n in CPA-1) . So these simulations confirm that we can distinguish G 6 3 from a random permutation with the complexity that we have given.
5 Generic Attacks when k ≥ 4 and k ≤ d ≤ 2k − 1
Attacks for k Rounds
We first describe a CPA-1 attack with two messages. All the blocks of these two messages are equal to zero except the first one. We test if
, this will occur with probability 1 if f is a G k l , and with probability 2 −n if f is a random permutation. This gives the result.
As usual, we transform this attack into a KPA attack with m = O(2
). In that case with a high probability
Attacks for k + t Rounds, with 1 ≤ t < k − 1
In the CPA-1 attack, we choose ∀i, I ) denotes the standard deviation. This can be easily proved using the Covariance Formula, see Appendix A or full version of this article [13] .
For an unbalanced Feistel scheme, the preceding condition appears at random, but we also have the following property:
, the standard deviation can be computed by using the Covariance Formula, as we have shown for G 4 3 (see full version of this article for the details [13] ). Thus we distinguish when 2 )n , which is compatible with the bound given above.
As usual, we are able transform this attack into a KPA attack which succeeds if m ≥ 2
)n .
Attacks for 2k − 1 Rounds
In that case we can only mount a KPA attack. We consider the following KPA attack: let N be the number of pairs (i, j), i < j, such that I 
is also implied by the following equations:
. This is because
2 )n . We can remark that for more than 2k rounds we will have to proceed with different attacks, since
Attacks with more than 2 kn Computations
Until now we have studied Unbalanced Feistel schemes with random functions. In practice, for example in designing block ciphers we need to consider generators of pseudo-random permutations. In this section, we will describe attacks against a generator of permutations (and not only against a single permutation randomly generated by a generator of permutations), i.e. we will be able to study several permutations generated by the generator. This allows more than 2 kn computations. Let G be a "G d k generator", i.e. from a binary string K, G generates a d round unbalanced Feistel permutation G d k . Let G be a truly random permutation generator, i.e. from a string K, G generates a truly random permutation G K of B kn . Let G be a truly random even permutation generator, i.e. from a string K, G generates a truly random permutation G K of A kn , with A kn being the group of all the permutations of {0, 1} kn → {0, 1} kn with even signature. We are looking for attacks that distinguish G from G , and also for attacks that will distinguish G from G .
Adversarial model: an attacker can choose some strings K 1 , . . . K f , can ask for some inputs [I 1 , . . . , I k ], and can ask for some G Kα [I 1 , . . . , I k ] (with K α being one of the K i ). Here the attack is more general than in the previous sections, since the attacker can have access to many different permutations generated by the same generator.
Adversarial goal: the aim of the attacker is to distinguish G from G (or from G ) with a high probability and with a complexity as small as possible.
Brute Force Attacks
A possible attack is an exhaustive search for the d round functions f 1 , . . . , f d from {0, 1}
(k−1)n to {0, 1} n that have been used in the unbalanced Feistel construction. This attack always exists, but since we have 2 The proof of this theorem is quite similar to the proof in the case of a symmetric Feistel scheme [11, 3] . However the fact that α ≥ 2 changes a few things. Consequently a complete proof is included in the full version [13] , available from the authors.
Let f be a permutation from kn bits to kn bits. Then using O(2 kn ) computations on the 2 kn input/output values of f , we can compute the signature of f .
To achieve this we just compute all the cycles
c i and use the formula:
The consequence is that it is possible to distinguish G a generator of G Remark: to compute the signature of a permutation g we need however to know all the input/outputs of g (or all of them minus one, since the last one can be found from the others if g is a permutation). 
Attacks of G
. Let us describe the KPA attack which concentrates on S 1 = X k+1 . Let N be the number of pairs (i, j), i < j, such that
There we have necessary I 
Thus we can distinguish the two generators when: µ · 
We have µ permutations and the attack proceeds as follows: let N be the number of pairs (i, j), i < j, such that these ϕ + 1 equations are satisfied. When we are testing a permutation generator, we have
With a G 
Conclusion
Until now, attacks and proofs of security on contracting unbalanced Feistel Schemes have not received much attention. There are much more papers on classical Feistel schemes and even attacks on expanding unbalanced Feistel schemes have been more studied than attacks on contracting unbalanced Feistel schemes.
This may be not justified since contracting Feistel schemes seem to have very good security properties. For example, to avoid all known generic attacks with the number of messages less than 2 kn (where kn is the number of bits of the input and the output) with these schemes, we need only 2k rounds (if k ≥ 4) or 7 rounds (if k = 3). So each bit will be changed only 2 times (if k ≥ 4) unlike with balanced Feistel schemes where 3 changes (i.e. 6 rounds) are necessary and unlike expanding unbalanced Feistel schemes where much more changes are needed [4, 11, 14] . 
